Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1970

Article 4

4-1970

Reform of the Blue Sky Laws
James S. Mofsky

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James S. Mofsky, Reform of the Blue Sky Laws, 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 599 (1970)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/4

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Reform of the Blue Sky Laws
James S. Mofsky*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the fourteen years since the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Securities Act, much time and effort have been expended in revising the
blue sky laws. The persons and organizations sponsoring such revision
have generally approached their tasks with the objective of achieving
some uniformity in an area which, since its inception, has been plagued
with a multitude of diverse laws and rules often administered according
to unpublished standards, sometimes in an uneven manner. Another
announced objective has been the re-evaluation of the function of
securities regulation in light of modern conditions. Toward the goal of
uniformity, the legislatures of 25 states' have enacted statutes which
purport to be based upon the Uniform Securities Act, and two other
states have enacted versions of the Act's registration by coordination
provisions 2 But the sponsors in many of these states, apparently in an
effort to improve upon the draftsmanship of Professor Loss and Mr.
Cowett, felt free to apply their personal handiwork in revising the
Uniform Act for adoption in their own jurisdictions. Thus, the present
state of affairs reveals that, while there is greater uniformity than
before, less than half of the states have enacted all four parts of the
Act,3 and even these states treat the Act in an often nonuniform
manner. With respect to the re-evaluation objective, several states have
enacted entire revisions of their securities laws which are shocking in
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami. The author is indebted to his colleague,

Professor Hugh L. Sowards of the University of Miami School of Law, for his advice in the

preparation of this article.
1. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The
Nevada and New Jersey legislatures enacted only the broker-dealer provisions. I BLUE SKY L.
REP.
4901 (1969).
2. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111 (West Supp. 1969); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5817(C) (1964).
3. The Act is divided into 4 parts: (1) fraudulent and other prohibited practices; (2)
registration of broker-dealers, agents and investment advisers; (3) registration of securities; and
(4) general provisions applicable to each of the first 3 parts. The Act was divided in this manner
so that any one of the first 3 parts could be enacted separately or in combination with other parts.
See L. Loss & E. CowErT, BLUE SKY LAW 249 (1958).
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their overly regulatory approach and their strong reliance upon the old
subjective standards which were targets of criticism in the predecessor
blue sky laws
Any discussion of reform in this area must distinguish between the
uniformity goal and the more significant need for reappraisal of the
philosophy underlying the traditional merit systems prevailing in most
of the states, under which securities administrators are given broad
powers to evaluate the "merits" of any offering. In this connection,
lawyers blue skying a national issue have suffered for years from the
unnecessary complexity and variety of forms, procedures and
substantive rules which are often vague and unpublished.' This problem
has generally served only to raise the cost of compliance. Thus, lawyers
have charged higher fees in accordance with the extra time needed to
uncover and meet the diversity of regulations. This added cost has been
passed on to the corporations they represent. But the problems
stemming from the policy of merit regulation have had a greater
impact than the lack of uniformity, since they may actually prohibit
businessmen from financing new ventures via the market for public
capital. Reform in this context has scarcely been considered, and the
blue sky administrators continue to retain great power over the
financial structures of companies offering securities in their
jurisdictions.
This power is manifest primarily in regulations designed to (1)
limit the amount of stock taken by organizers of new businesses for
their promotional activities (promotional and "cheap" stock); (2) limit
the amount of dilution of the public investors' interests; (3) require a
minimum dollar amount which must be contributed to the
corporation's capital by the promoters in cash or its equivalent
depending on the price charged to outside investors;' (4) require escrow
4. For a discussion of the new Wisconsin and California laws, see the textual material
beginning at note 24 infra.
5. Gray, Blue Sky Practice-A Morass?, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1401, 1519 (1969).
6. For rules with respect to items 1, 2, and 3 listed in the text, see Cal. Admin.
Code § 260.140.31 (1969), I BLUE SKY L. REP.
8619 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.155
(1967), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
31,121 (1969); Regs:Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, Order Nos. S-5, S-7,
I BLUE SKY L. REP.
6655, 6657 (1963); Sec. Rules, Ark. State Bank Dept., Sec. Div., Rule
5c (1968), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
7605 (1968); Regs. Colo. Div. Sec., Rule V(D), I BLUE SKY
L.

REP.

9706 (1967); Rules Fla. Sec. Comm'n, 330-1.08, I

BLUE

SKY L. REP. $ 13,608

(1968); Regs. Idaho Comm'r Fin. § 27, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
15,616 (1968); Gen. Rules &
Regs. Ill. Sec. Law, Rule 150, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
16,627 (1967); 81 Kan. Admin. Regs.,
art. 81-7-4(c), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
19,707 (1966); Ky. Dept. of Banking & Sec., Supp. to
Admin. Ruling No. 1, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
20,601 (1969); Mich. Dept. Commerce, Sec. Bur.,
Rule 706.6, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
25,635 (1969); Minn. Admin. Rules & Regs., S. Div. 42, 2
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of promotional shares for a period of time or until an earnings or

dividend test has been met; 7 (5) restrict the number of options and
warrants granted; (6) restrict the amount paid as expenses in
connection with the public offering;8 and (7) regulate the kinds of
securities sold publicly (restrictions on nonvoting and senior
securities).9

In short, blue sky administrators, through such regulation, may
virtually dictate the capital structures and methods of financing of

firms offering securities in their jurisdictions. If the businessman is
unhappy with the administrator's rules or unable to comply with them,
he may of course withdraw the offering from that state and attempt

to sell it in another state which has less strict regulations. As a
practical matter, this result has occurred on many occasions. But the

fact an underwriter may withdraw an issue that does not qualify, for
example, in Illinois and offer it in New York merely serves to

emphasize the need for revision in Illinois, if the costs of such
regulation to Illinois are greater than the benefits. Thus, the policy of

merit qualification of securities is the area most in need of reappraisal
and reform.
BLUE SKY L. REP.
26,604 (1966); Okla. See. Comm'n Statement of Policy, 2 BLUE SKY L.
REP.
39,707 (1967); Ore. (not published); S.D. Regs. Comm'r Sec., pt. IIG, 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP.
44,609 (1967); Tenn. Comm'r of Ins. & Banking, Admin. Rulings, pt. 1, 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP.
45,63.1 (1967); Tex. Sec. Comm'r Regs., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
46,601 (1968); Utah
Sec. Comm'n, Form Letter #10 (1967); Wash. Adm'r of Sec., Rule 11, 3 BLUE SKY'L. REP:
50,611 (1968); Wyo. Secretary of State, Rules & Reg., ch. IV, § 1(c), 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP.
53,612(1968).
7. ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 34(b) (Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.110(g) (1962); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.1876 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1245(g) (1966); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25141 (West Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-10(7) (1963); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 517.18 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-104.1(c) (1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 485-18
(1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1428 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.11(E) (SmithHurd Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-860() (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.20
(1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1259(d) (Supp. 1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.380(2) (1963);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:713 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(305)(f) (Supp. 1969); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 5364 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.305(0 (Supp" 1969); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 15-2011(2) (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1108(2) (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 49:3-61(e) (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-19(C) (1966); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 78-11(1) (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 10-04-08.1 (1) (Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1707.09(K) (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. §TAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 305(g) (Supp. 1969); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 59.085(3) (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-165 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1650
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. -§ -61-1-11(7) (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4223 (1958); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-510(h) (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.250 (1961); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 32-1-16 (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 189.17(1) (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117.11(g)
(1965); Minn. Admin. Rules & Regs., S. Div. 43, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
26,604 (1966); S.C.
Regs. Comm'r Sec., pt. I IG, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
44,609 (1967).
8. Cf., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 137.5(B)(3), (C)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
9. See, e.g., Fla. Sec. Comm'n Rule 330-1.09, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
13,609 (1970).
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The foregoing emphasis on the merit system of securities
qualification is not intended to imply that the other aspects of the state
securities law (broker-dealer regulation and the fraud and enforcement
provisions) are not in need of analysis. A majority of the states have
laws dealing with the competency, criminal background and honesty,
and financial responsibility of persons wishing to engage in the
securities business. 0 With respect to competency, most of the states
prescribe examinations that are so simple they may be successfully
passed by a person with very little training, experience, and
knowledge." The background investigation is often no more than a
questionnaire asking whether the applicant has been convicted of
certain crimes, supplemented in some states by fingerprinting that is
checked against FBI files. 2 Financial responsibility is measured by a
minimum capital 13 and/or bonding requirement.
The competency and financial responsibility standards are so
minimal that they tend to have little impact. In any event, brokerdealer regulation in the states is generally confined to qualification with
the foregoing minimum requirements before a prospective brokerdealer may enter the industry, and there has been practically no
enforcement of broker-dealer standards after initial clearance for entry
into the business. Almost all broker-dealers, however, join the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or become registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission before engaging in the securities
business. Consequently, they must comply with the NASD or SEC
rules which are usually at least as strict as those of the state with
respect to competency, background, and financial responsibility. Thus
blue sky regulation in this area is in most instances a duplication of
federal or NASD regulation. As such, meaningful revision probably
would include repeal of the broker-dealer provisions in the state laws.
But the cost of such regulation is probably not very great, and it does
not appear that the laws are severe enough to preclude many persons
from entry into the business.
The fraud and enforcement provisions of the blue sky laws, like
the enforcement provisions in the broker-dealer area, have been
neglected by most of the state administrators who have concentrated
their efforts on disclosure and judgment of the merits of offerings prior
10. See I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 43-48 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1962).
11.
Nov. 24,
12.
13.
14.

See Peterson, Maybe I Knew Just Enough to be Dangerous, The National Observer,
1969, at I, col. 1.
See, e.g., Fla. Sec. Comm'n Rule 330-3.09.
See, e.g., Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 10, Rule 260.216.12 (1969) ($25,000).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (Supp. 1969) ($5,000).
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to public sale. Thus the administrators have had little impact with
respect to investigation and prosecution of fraudulent promoters. For
this reason and for the reasons given with respect to regulation of entry
of broker-dealers into the securities industry, revision in these areas is
probably not critically needed. Consequently, the primary emphasis of
this article is confined to the problems of reform in connection with
the policy of merit qualification of securities.
I I.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

One cannot present a careful analysis of the possibilities of reform
of the state securities laws without giving appropriate recognition to
certain political realities. After all, the power of the blue sky
administrators is granted by statute, and the potential for revision of
these statutes rests with the members of the state legislatures. Thus it
is important to consider such matters as the composition of state
legislatures, political groups who would lobby for change, and political
forces that would be against reform.
Because of the method of election of state legislators, most
legislatures have traditionally been controlled by rural representatives.
Although this situation has begun to change in recent years, rural
legislators are still a significant factor in many state legislatures. Such
representatives tend to be unsophisticated in matters such as securities
regulation. Even most urban legislators have little if any understanding
of the complexities of the marketing of securities and the functions and
activities of broker-dealers. Consequently, it is unlikely that most
legislators would propose significant reform in this complicated and
specialized area. Furthermore, it is not surprising that such lawmakers
approach new or different concepts in securities regulation with
considerable trepidation. This fear is heightened considerably when
they are told by blue sky administrators that the existing merit system
in this area "has, in countless instances, protected investors and saved,
in the aggregate, many millions of dollars."' 5 This statement by
administrators has typified the rationale for the existence of blue sky
laws since Kansas enacted the first law in 1911.16
15. Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE
L. REV. 1417, 1445 (1969).
16. Ch. 133 [1911] Kan. Session Laws (H.B. 906) (amended by Senate Bill 145, Session of
1913). As administrator of the first comprehensive regulatory statute in this area, J.N. Dolley,
in his first annual report stated: "This law, as you know, was something entirely new in the
business world, but I am pleased to inform you that we have worked the same out in a very nice
shape and accomplished some wonderful results. I estimate that it has saved the people of this
State at least six million dollars since its enactment. Between fourteen and fifteen hundred

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

-[VOL. 23

The modern administrators have not offered any evidence of the
number of "millions" that have allegedly been saved; nor have they
inquired into the quantitative losses to their states' economies
occasioned by the denial of or withdrawal from registration of
securities that do not meet the applicable standards. Most legislators
simply do not have enough interest and understanding in this area to
request such evidence. Instead, unsophisticated elected representatives
generally find it easier and more politically expedient to withdraw from
any controversy and not tamper with existing statutes and rules. This
reaction is certainly understandable when the members of the
legislature are presented with a so-called professional statement by the
state administrator that "our files . . . and undoubtedly the files in

most other states, are replete with cases where securities applications
were withdrawn or never filed because of objections involving
soundness or fairness and where the issuer subsequently met financial
17
disaster. '
Legislators who have little experience or background in an area
generally rely on the opinions and judgments of their fellow law-makers
who have some expertise with respect to the particular problem.
Experience has demonstrated that this proposition is true with respect
to reform of the blue sky laws, except in those instances when the
proposed reform is opposed by the state securities administrator for
reasons similar to those stated above. In the latter case, it is simply
more politically prudent for the unsophisticated legislator to side with
the forces resisting change. Even if unopposed, a bill is often apt to be
caught in a legislative log-jam, and fail to be brought up for passage.'8
Another significant political reality is the fact that affirmative
sponsorship by important legislative leaders is necessary to enact major
revisions of laws. Assuming such leaders have no personal reasons for
fostering change, they will have to be provided with some trade-off as
an incentive for their support. This is not to imply that legislative
leaders regularly bargain for money in return for their help. But it is
true that politicans often require some benefit for themselves or their
companies have been investigated by this Department since the enactment of this law, and of this

number less than one hundred have been granted permits to sell their securities in Kansas."
Quoted in Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37,38 (1916) and L. Loss & E. Cownrr, BLUE
SKY LAW 9 (1958).
17. Hueni, supra note 15, at 1445.
18. For example, an unopposed bill sponsored by the Wisconsin Securities Administrator
designed to grant an exemption from registration to New York Stock Exchange listed companies
met such a fate. See Bolliger, The New Wisconsin Uniform Securities Law, 25 Bus. LAW. 223,
230 (1969).
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constituents before they will expend time and effort and use political
favors to help a cause in which they have no personal interest.
Therefore, those groups attempting to achieve fundamental reform of
the blue sky laws will be concerned with whether they can offer
something to induce political leaders to advocate such revision.
If reform movements do not originate with unsophisticated
legislators and if such politicians resist change when revision is opposed
by state administrators, there must be other groups.with the knowledge
and political muscle to propose changes and cause them to be acted
upon by legislatures. Other than the administrators themselves, lawyers
who represent public companies comprise the most knowledgeable
group in this area, and such persons might be expected to know where
change is most needed. But aside from procedural reforms that would
simplify the ministerial aspects of their work, it would be contrary to
the best interests of securities lawyers to advocate major revision in the
underlying policy of merit regulation. After all, attorneys are paid for
leading their clients through the morass of blue sky laws. 9
Furthermore,, experience has shown that many lawyers who have served
with government agencies indicate little appreciation for the economics
of the industries they regulate. Finally, it is unrealistic to think that
securities lawyers, who must maintain an amiable on-going relationship
with state administrators, would openly advance changes in the law to
which the administrators would be opposed. For example, at the annual
conference of the North American Securities Administrators, after
conclusion of a panel discussion of the philosophy of merit regulation, 0
I was approached by several of the securities lawyers in attendance.
These lawyers expressed approval of my arguments against the
paternalism of the blue sky laws but said they could not openly support
these propositions.
Businessmen whose firms are affected by blue sky regulation might
be persons who would sponsor revision. But companies that are already
public and have substantial assets are not frequently affected by the
state securities laws. This kind of regulation is aimed primarily at new
19. This statement is made with some reservation. Recently, the author has had the
opportunity to work with two South Florida securities lawyers who devoted considerable time and
effort to help effect some changes in the Florida securities laws. Due to their effort, amendments
were enacted to these laws in the 1969 Legislature. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.05, 517.06 (Supp. 1969).
See Mofsky, State Securities Regulation and New Promotions:A Case History, 15 WAYNE L.
REV. 1401 (1969).
20. Panel Discussion: What Price Blue Sky?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52ND ANNUAL
CONFERENCE, NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS (Oct. 1969).
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business promotions and speculative first offerings. 2 Accordingly,
corporate officials of companies that could afford to lobby for reform
are generally uninterested in such change, and corporate officials of
new promotions often cannot afford the costs of sponsoring revision.
Moreover, the founders and promoters of new businesses are not
organized for these or other purposes. The separate voices of promoters
of new ventures raised at different times are like cries from the
wilderness in the context of the kind of loud noise needed to generate
legislative action.
Other sources which might be expected to participate in reform
movements are investment banking firms that underwrite public
offerings of securities. The larger firms that are members of the major
national securities exchanges, however, generally do not underwrite the
kind of offering that would be seriously hampered by the merit system
of regulation. Several New York Stock Exchange member firms, for
example, usually require, among other standards, at least $2,000,000
in sales and $500,000 in net earnings before they will issue a letter of
intent for a firm commitment underwriting. Companies with sales and
earnings figures of this magnitude generally have substantial operating
histories and consequently would not be subject to rules regarding
minimum promoter investment, restrictions on cheap stock, dilution of
outside investors' interests, and escrow of promotion stock. Thus, with
the notable exception of the 1966 dealer-sponsored study in
Wisconsin,2 2 the larger brokerage concerns have not urged significant
reform. If they are confronted with severe restrictions in a particular
state, they simply omit that jurisdiction in the offering.23 It is also
probable that large national brokerage firms silently oppose reform in
this area, since the entry of additional businesses into the market for
21. As previously mentioned, such regulation is usually applied in terms of rules regarding
minimum promoters' investment, restrictions on cheap stock and dilution of outside investors'
interests, limitation on options and warrants, escrow of promotion stock, impoundment of
proceeds of an offering and regulation of the costs of an offering. For detailed discussion of these
matters, see Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and The Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
1447 (1969); Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE
L. REV. 1417 (1969); Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 273. For a case history illustrating how these standards are applied within a specific
jurisdiction, see Mofsky, supra note 19. See also FoRTuNE, July 1957, at 122.
22. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
23. "A number of large New York underwriting firms began to counter this treatment
[denial of registration] by simply adopting policies not to offer in Wisconsin. The result was a
denial of participation to Wisconsin dealers in underwriting and selling groups and denial of a

market in Wisconsin for important offerings which should have been available. Obviously, this
did not go unnoticed in the Wisconsin dealer community." Bolliger, supra note 18.
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public capital would provide unwanted competition for the public

investors' funds. It is the smaller over-the-counter investment banking
house engaged in the underwriting of new promotions that is most
dramatically affected by state regulation. But such broker-dealers
usually do not have the individual financial or organizational strength
to lobby effectively for such reform.
.11I.

STORY OF

Two STATES

Revision is sometimes sponsored by the administrators themselves.
But studies resulting in this revision have been undertaken under the
prejudiced predisposition that the philosophy underlying merit
regulation is essentially correct and not subject to challenge or in need
of rigorous economic testing. Thus these revisions in their final forms
are often guilty of sins quite similar to the ones they superseded. It is
submitted that this result occurred in connection with the new securities
statutes and rules enacted and adopted in the important commercial
states of California and Wisconsin.2
The former Commissioner of Corporations of California, under
whose auspices the new statute was drafted, heralded the new law as
"a major revision of the system and philosophy of securities regulation
in the State of California and
years. '" 2 He added:

. . .

the first such revision in over fifty

The New Law is the product of a drafting committee of outstanding
California lawyers, legislators, and law professors which I appointed in the Spring
of 1967. The objectives of this committee were a total reappraisal of the function
and purposes of securities regulation in California and the elimination of
regulatory effort and burden where such was unnecessary or duplicative of the
regulatory efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission.26

With such an impressive announced motivation underlying the revision,
one would be led to expect that the drafting committee would perform
a conscientious and objective study of the benefits and costs of
California's experience of over fifty years with a stringent merit system
of regulation. To this writer, for example, a "total reappraisal" ought
to include a quantitative measurement of the net loss or gain to
California's economy and its citizens as a result of its form of
regulation.
Critics of this suggestion could object only on the basis that it
24.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,000 et. seq. (West Supp. 1969); Wis. Uniform Securities Law,

ch. 71, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
52,202 (1969).
25. VOLK, THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE
CHANGE FROM PRIOR LAW 77 (1968).

26.

Id.

SECURITIEs LAW OF 1968-A SIGNIFICANT
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would not be feasible to perform such studies. But such studies can be
accomplished in a meaningful manner. With appropriate research, for
example, it would not be difficult to compute the gain or loss that
would result if a person had invested 10,000 dollars equally in those
securities issues that had been denied registration in California because
they did not meet that state's standards. Of course, to be manageable
this kind of measurement would have to be limited to securities that
were denied registration over a specific and representative time period.
The net gain or loss from the above computation could then be
compared with the gain or loss which would result if a person had
invested 10,000 dollars equally in those securities issues that did qualify
for registration in California during the same time period.
If this calculation showed that the regulation had saved the
imaginary investor a significant amount, the drafting committee would
have performed a form of reappraisal that justified a continuation of
strict regulation. It is this writer's opinion that contrary results would
be indicated. But no such study or comparable analysis was
undertaken, and it is interesting that the drafting committee was
composed of lawyers, legislators, and law professors, but that it did not
include economists or persons trained in such analysis. Another kind
of analysis that could have been an obvious contribution in this
connection would have been a comparison of California with New
York's substantial experience with non-merit type regulation. Again,
however, this possibility was not reported as having been seriously
considered. Nevertheless, the committee moved forward and prepared
an exhaustive scheme of regulation which, while it is an improvement,
is in this writer's opinion excessively regulatory and too narrow in its
exemptions.
Although a detailed critique of the new California law is not
within the scope of this article; it might be beneficial to examine several
of the more important changes in the statute. Probably the most
significant areas of substantive modification in the new law are the
exemptions from regulation.2 Of the exemptions contained in the
majority of blue sky laws, the one most commonly used for the
financing of small businesses is the private or limited offering
exemption. The.philosophy underlying this exemption is based upon the
social and economic benefits that result from permitting the organizers
of new businesses to raise their requisite capital from a limited number
of friends, relatives, and acquaintances without being subjected to the
27. Id. at 78.
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expense, time, and possibility of denial associated with qualification of

securities.
There is some form of limited offering exemption presently

available in 47 states! 8 The statutes of 27 states29 contain exemptions
for offers directed to not more than a stated number of persons

(ranging from 10 to 25 offerees) during any twelve month period,
provided the seller reasonably believes all buyers are purchasing for
investment and no commission or other remuneration is paid for

soliciting offerees. Statutes in fourteen states characterize the
exemption in terms of the number of ultimate shareholders after the

sale of securities (ranging from 5 to 35 shareholders).

Four states have

statutes which limit the exemption in terms of the number of offerees

or buyers (15 to 30) and/or a maximum dollar amount (25,000 to
28. The statutes of Minnesota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont do not expressly
provide limited offering exemptions. These states, however, have been included in computing this
number because the isolated sale exemption is available to the "issuer." See MINN. STAT.
ANN.

§ 80.06(2) (Supp. 1970); R.I.
§ 47-31-82 (1967); VT. STAT.

GEN. LAWS ANN.

§ 7-11-8(a) (1956); S.D.

COMPILED LAWS

tit. 9, § 4204(3) (1947). Although no such exemptions
are contained in the New Hampshire, Delaware, and Connecticut statutes, exemptions would not
be needed in Connecticut and Delaware since there is no requirement for registration of securities
in those jurisdictions. Consequently, some form of small offering exemption is available in all
states except New Hampshire.
29. ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 38(i) (Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.140(b)(5) (1962); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 67-1248(b)(9) (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-13(2)(j) (1963); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 517.06(11) (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-107() (1968); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 485-6(9) (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1435(8) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121! ,
§ 137.4(G) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-855(b)(10) (Supp. 1969); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 502.5(15) (Supp. 1970); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410(9) (Baldwin 1969); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:705(12) (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §.26(b)(9) (1967);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(402)(b)(9) (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.402(b)(9) (Supp.
1970); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 15-2014(8) (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111(9) (Supp.
1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.075 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-50(b)(9) (Supp. 1970); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 78-4(7) (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401(b)(9) (1965); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 59.035(12) (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-52(9) (1962); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5815(I) (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.320(9) (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117-14(b)
(1965).
New York has in effect enacted an exemption limiting the number of offerees since it
impliedly adopted the private offering exemption available under the federal act. See N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 359-ff(5) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1844(10) (1967); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2510(h) (West
Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.5(15) (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(h)
(1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 874(9) (Supp. 1970); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5384.5 (Supp.
1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-22() (1966); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(0) (Page
1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 32(0(10) (1965); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 581-5(1) (1964);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-14(2)(i) (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(b)(8) (Supp. 1968); W.VA.
CODE ANN. § 32-1-4(h) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 189.07(1) (1957).
ANN.

ANN.
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100,000 dollars).3 Finally, the remaining jurisdictions have isolated
sale exemptions which operate as limited offering exemptions3
Prior to the 1968 law, there was no such exemption in California 3
The new exemption is limited to the offer or sale of voting common
stock by a California corporation if, after conclusion of the proposed
sale, "there will be only one class of stock of such corporation
outstanding which is owned beneficially by no more than five
persons. 34 The exemption is further restricted to placements where
there has been no advertisement, and no selling expenses or
promotional considerations have been paid or incurred. Unless some
other exemption is available (and there are generally no other
meaningful exemptions available in California for most new or recently
organized businesses), a corporation which already has five
shareholders must qualify its securities before it can solicit and accept
new capital.
Except for New Hampshire where there is no limited offering
exemption at all,.3 the California exemption is the most restrictive in
the United States. Whereas the statutes in a majority of jurisdictions3 7
exempt the offer of securities to a limited number of persons during a
twelve month period, California places a permanent maximum
limitation of five on the "number of ultimate shareholders. If there are
several promoters of the new company and they wish to participate as
shareholders, the number of persons from whom they can raise
necessary capital is thus seriously limited. For example, if there are
three promoters who anticipate contributing only an idea and knowhow to the new company, they must raise the entire working capital
from only two investors if they wish to avail themselves of the
exemption. The severe restriction on numbers may also create control
problems which eventually cause promoters to forsake forming the new
business rather than surrender control to outside investors3 In short,
See GA. CODE ANN. § 97-107(i) (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. I 10A, § 3(f)
CENT. CODE § 10-04-06(9) (Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1632(G) (1964).
32. See note 28 supra.
33. VOLK, supra note 25, at 81.
34. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,102(h) (West Supp. 1970).
35. "Promotional consideration means any consideration paid directly or indirectly to a
person who, acting alone or in conjunction with one or more persons, takes the initiative in
founding and organizing the business or enterprise of an issuer, for services rendered in connection
with such founding or organizing." Id. § 25,102(h)(4).
36. See note 28 supra.
37. See note 29 supra.
38. For a more detailed discussion of this control problem, see Mofsky, Blue Sky
Restrictions on New Business Promotions. 1969 DUKE L.J. 273, 281.
31.

(1967); N.D.
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this number restriction is entirely too narrow and, from the experience
of this writer, not very helpful in the private financing of new
businesses.
The limitation of the exemption to California corporations and the
prohibition against selling expenses are also unjustifiable. The fact that
a business is incorporated in California rather than Delaware provides
little extra protection to shareholders of that firm, and in many
instances it is very desirable for shareholders to have the participation
and interest of investment bankers or other financial intermediaries in
the firm's development 9 Such participation or interest will usually not
be given in connection with small, closely held companies unless the
investment banker is paid a fee for his assistance in raising the initial
capital.
Another new exemption which the former Commissioner labels as
significant40 is the provision which eliminates the requirement that an
issuer obtain a negotiating permit in a nonpublic offering. This
provision exempts an offering which is not public, provided an
agreement delivered pursuant to the offer conditions the issuance of
securities and the acceptance of payment therefore upon the later
qualification of such securities.!4' No part of the purchase price may be
received and none of the securities may be issued until the securities are
qualified. The proposed rules of the Commissioner define a nonpublic
offering in this context as one in which the offering is made to not more
2
than 25 persons via direct negotiation.1
Under this exemption, it is conceivable that a promoter could
spend considerable time and funds in preparation of a financial plan
and in organizing an investment group, only to have the Commissioner
of Corporations reject the proposal for failing to meet the fair, just,
and equitable standard which has been retained in the new statutes.4 3
But aside from the uncertainty and costliness of this kind of regulation,
it is difficult to understand why the drafting committee did not simply
provide a blanket 25 person exemption modeled after the private
39. For a detailed discussion of these points, see id. at 278-81. Recent amendments to the
Florida Securities Act have abolished the incorporation in Florida requirement and the
prohibition against selling expenses in connection with post-incorporation private placements.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.06(11) (Supp. 1969). The new exemption in the revised Wisconsin law
also eliminates the requirement that the issuer be a Wisconsin corporation and the Wisconsin
Commissioner is granted authority to waive the prohibition against selling expenses. Wis.
Uniform Securities Law. ch. 71, § 551.23, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
52,213 (1969).
40. See VOLK, supra note 25, at 80.

41.

CAL. CORP. CODE

42.
43.

See VOLK, supra note 25, at 80.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,140 (West Supp. 1969).

§ 25,102(a) (West Supp. 1969).
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offering exemption contained in section 4(2) of the Securities Act of
1933.!1 It would be hardly unsound to grant corporations an exemption
to offer and sell securities to 25 financially sophisticated persons in
California. This exemption has apparently worked well with respect to
the federal law, as evidenced by the fact that the SEC has not
recommended any change to the Congress. It is submitted that it would
be more efficient to assign administrative personnel to the investigation
and prosecution of fraud rather than to the job of evaluating the merits
of a new business; the market's judgment in this respect has always
proved superior.
The former California Commissioner has stated that the above
exemptions, together with several other narrow exemptions," would
reduce "the workload of the Division of Corporations in connection
with qualifications by in excess of 60 percent thereby reducing by
twelve thousand the number of permits processed under the existing law
during a typical fiscal year."46 Since there were approximately 500 staff
members in the Division of Corporations prior to the enactment of the
new law, there should now be approximately 200 employees. The cost
of those 300 displaced staff members who formerly examined offerings
of the type now exempted must have been tremendous. Professor
Bloomenthal has suggested how much more justifiable that cost would
have been if the 300 employees, properly trained, had been efficiently
operating in the area of enforcement of the fraud provisions of blue sky
laws, an area in which the state administrators have hardly
functioned.-7 With a greater emphasis on enforcement, the truly
fraudulent promoter who, for example, does not register the securities
at all and offers them in direct contravention of the state laws could
be discovered, investigated, and prosecuted. Yet by virtue of their
present misallocation of manpower the state administrators seldom
reach such activity.
The new Wisconsin securities law was undertaken with a view
toward structural revision and bringing the law of Wisconsin into
accord with modern needs.48 But the results in Wisconsin may be
44.
45.

Cf.15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1964).
These other exemptions include New York Stock Exchange listed securities; securities

issued by railroads, common carriers, and public utilities; offers to banks, savings institutions,
trusts and insurance companies, and registered investment companies; offers to certain

institutional investors; certain subsidiary investments; and certain reorganizations. CAL.
§§
46.
47.
48.

CODE

25102, 25103, 25104 (West Supp. 1970); see VOLK, supra note 25, at 8 1.
VOLK, supra note 25, at 81.
See Bloomenthal, supra note 21, at 1481.
Bolliger, supra note 18, at 231.
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analogized to those in California: an exhaustive, overly regulatory, and
highly discretionary law which, while it purports to provide the
groundwork for uniformity with other states, differs in major
substantive and technical respects from the Uniform Securities Act.
The political factors which resulted in the new Wisconsin statute
and rules are interesting, and these factors shed some light on the
practical problems of revision in this area. For several years prior to
1967, a significant number of registrations were denied qualification in
Wisconsin on grounds which were considered highly questionable by
the brokerage firms underwriting the issues. Members of the investment
banking community complained that registration statements were
examined and rejected under subjective unpublished standards. 9
Further, such standards were often not uniformly applied. A study
sponsored by a group of dealers revealed that 26 national offerings had
been denied registration in Wisconsin, even though most of them
involved listed companies of a blue chip or nearly comparable quality.
Of this sample, twenty were rejected only in Wisconsin5 Wisconsin
broker-dealers complained to the governor and a committee was
formed to improve relations between the members of the securities
industry and the Department of Securities. As a result of these
communications, the Department of Securities agreed to sponsor a bill
which would exempt certain securities of New York Stock Exchange
listed companies. Although this bill was unopposed, it was not enacted
because of the crowded legislative calendar
At that time, Wisconsin was unique in failing to provide an
exemption for securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange.12 Yet
the exemption bill failed passage even though it had the backing of the
interested New York Stock Exchange member firms. Subsequently,
after the 'appointment of a new Commissioner in 1967, a study
committee was formed and, approximately eighteen months later, after
extensive consideration and drafting, a revised securities law was
enacted. The securities industry was represented on that committee by
members of large investment banking firms which, for reasons already
stated, probably would be uninterested in liberalizing the law for new
and speculative first issues. In any event, representatives of the industry
constituted only four of the fifteen members of the committee.
49. Id. at 230.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 231.
52. See Stock Exchange Exemption Chart, I BLUE SKY L. REp. 851-58 (1970).
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Economists trained in the kind of analysis previously suggested were
not represented on the committee.
While the finished product is called the "Wisconsin Uniform
Securities Law,"5' 3 the use of the word "uniform" is not entirely
accurate. The draftsmen of the new Wisconsin law departed from the
Uniform Securities Act in many respects. One of the most significant
areas of difference is the retention of the fair and equitable standards
in the new law.54 Not only does this retention add to the lack of
uniformity, but it continues much of the uncertainty which previously
existed with respect to whether an issue would qualify under this
standard of the Wisconsin law. Furthermore, it fails to recognize the
needs of businessmen to capitalize their new ventures in the
marketplace for public capital 5 The present Wisconsin Commissioner
is a knowledgeable and responsible administrator, and he has published
rules which attempt to define "fair" and "equitable.""' It can be
anticipated that he will cause the standard to be administered in an
evenhanded manner. But the writer has fiever seen a rule which provides
a satisfactory all-inclusive definition of those words for the purpose of
the regulation of securities. Moreover, a statute cannot be drafted
based upon the enlightened administration of a particular
commissioner, since another administrator is always just around the
corner. Finally, the regulation should not be so oppressive that new
promotions are cut off from the supply of public capital. Definite
standards which have a sound relation to contemporary business
problems are sorely needed in this area if businessmen are to be granted
a reasonable opportunity to accomplish their financial plans with some
certainty.
A comprehensive analysis of the new Wisconsin and California
securities laws could easily be the subject of two separate articles. The
few provisions of those statutes which are discussed above serve only
to illustrate the direction which revision has taken recently in two
important commercial states. It is submitted that while the draftsmen
of those statutes did indeed effect considerable improvements over the
pre-existing laws 57 they did not in fact truly reappraise the philosophy
53. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.10 (Supp. 1969).
54. Id. § 551.28(e). In fairness, it should be pointed out that Wisconsin has adopted the
registration by coordination, broker-dealer licensing and anti-fraud provisions of the Uniform
Securities Act.
55. In this connection, see Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions,
1969 DuKE L.J. 273.

56.

3 BLUE SKY L. REP.

57.

Such improvements would include the broad secondary trading exemption, the stock

52,603 (1970).
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underlying the blue sky laws. Such an examination is necessary before
any meaningful revision can be drafted and enacted. If the California
and Wisconsin experiences typify the kind of reform which iesults when
state administrators participate and help sponsor the revision, then
meaningful change must come without their assistance. Such
administrators are simply too wedded to the regulatory philosophy to
appreciate the need to balance other interests.
IV.

THE QUEST FOR UNIFORMITY

Wisconsin is not the only state which has added a fair, just, or
equitable standard to a version of the Uniform Securities Act. Similar
modifications were made in the Uniform Act as adopted by Kansas,
Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, and Oregon.58 Obviously, such
tampering defeats the very purpose of the Act as well as adding to the
problems of uncertainty and wide discretion associated with such vague
standards.
But modification of the Uniform Act by individual state
legislatures is not the only factor which has contributed to frustration
in the quest for uniformity. More important are certain elements which
are built into the Act itself. For example, the Act, as previously
mentioned, is divided into four distinct parts which are designed
specifically to stand alone or in any combination. A legislature may,
for example, enact only the broker-dealer portion of the Uniform Act
and a totally different statute with respect to the registration and
qualification of securities or enact no statute at all dealing with
registration of securities 9 Thus the structure of the Act may work
against uniformity.
Section 412(a) of the Act provides that:
The [Administrator] may from time to time make, amend, and rescind such rules,
forms, and orders as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this act, including

rules and forms governing registration statements, applications, and reports, and
defining any terms, whether or not used in this act, insofar as the definitions are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this act. For the purpose of rules and forms,
the [Administrator] may classify securities, persons, and matters within [his]
jurisdiction, and prescribe different requirements for different classes.

This extremely broad rule-making power is probably the most
exchange exemption, and the extension of the law to cover offers, sales and purchases, and the
extension of the anti-fraud provisions.
58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1260 (1964); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 451.706(E) (1967);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.306(a)(E) (Supp. 1969-70); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-19.8 (1966); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 59.095(3) (1967).
59.

E.g., Nevada and New Jersey.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL, 23

significant factor operating against uniformity. This fact becomes clear
when the rule-making section is read together with section 306 of the
Act:
The [Administrator] may issue a stop order denying effectiveness to, or suspending
or revoking the effectiveness of, any registration statement if [he] finds (1) that
the order is in the public interest and (2) that . . (F) the offering has been or
would be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' discounts,
commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or participation, or
unreasonable amounts or kinds of options .... "

Accordingly, each administrator may by rule define "reasonable" as
this word relates to promotional stock, outside investor's dilution,
promoters' investment, options, and the costs of a public offering. It
is not surprising to find that the regulations dealing with these matters
differ markedly among those states which have adopted the Act. Thus
while the statutes may be uniform, the regulations may vary greatly,
and in practice the regulations have a greater impact on the
qualification of securities than do the statutory provisions."0
But even if the statutes and the rules could be made uniform, this
result does not cure the heart of the problem-the basic
unreasonableness of the merit system and its serious economic
consequences. In this regard, through provisions granting broad control
over such matters as promoters' participation and options, the
Uniform Securities Act retains the philosophy that is most in need of
reappraisal and reform. In fairness to the draftsmen of the Uniform
Act, it should be noted that there was no intention to re-evaluate the
merit system or offer an alternative method of regulation, such as full
disclosure only. This result was probably based on the fact that most
of the states already had merit statutes.' This situation probably would
have presented an insurmountable obstacle to widespread acceptance of
a non-merit type Act. In fact, some authorities in the area objected to
the Act on the grounds that it was not sufficiently wedded to the merit
2
philosophy.
V.

FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION

Critics of the merit approach and the wide diversity among the
state laws have suggested federal pre-emption of the regulation of
60. There have been attempts to achieve some uniformity in this area. Fo example, see the
various statements of policy of the Midwestern Securities Commissioners Association. 1 BLUE
SKY L. REP.
4722-96 (1970).

61. See Bloomenthal, supra note 21, at 1448.
62. See, e.g., Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor
Protection,23 LAW & CONmMP. PROB. 193, 226 (1958).
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interstate securities sales as a solution.63 They argue that this result can
be accomplished by an amendment to section 18 of the Securities Act
of 1933 which provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission
(or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State or Territory of
the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person."

Securities regulation would not, of course, be the only commercial
field where the federal government has effected pre-emption, if
Congress should decide to amend section 18 in the public interest.
Precedent for such pre-emption exists in several other industries. For
example, railroad securities are exempt from regulation by any state
or federal government agency except by the Interstate CommerCe
Commission.65 The Bank Holding Company Act provides for exclusive
federal control over the organization of such banking institutions.66 The
area of communications is another important field in which there has
7
been federal pre-emption.1
But even if federal pre-emption were constitutionally possible, the
political realities of achieving this result are extremely difficult to
overcome, and the possible long-term consequences of such action are
potentially more detrimental than the present state of affairs. First of
all, the proponents of states rights would immediately rally in their
attempt to block passage of any such bill in Washington. The strong
influence of such persons in their attempt to preserve aspects of current
state securities regulation has already been demonstrated. 6 Next, the
significant length of time that is required eventually to enact a
controversial bill may postpone any such proposal far into the future.
The problems connected with passage of the proposed mutual fund
legislation, which has been bogged down for over three years, illustrate
this. Furthermore, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission would probably oppose such change. The SEC works
closely and cooperates with the state securities commissions. To
illustrate, at meetings of state organizations like the North American
63. Millonzi, Concurrent Regulation of InterstateSecurities Issues: The Need for
Congressional Reappraisal,49 VA. L. REv. 1483 (1963); Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA.

L. REV. 713 (1958).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1964).
65. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20a(7) (1964); Securities Act of 1933,
§ 3(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(6) (1964).
66. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (Supp. IV, 1969).
67. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Allen B. Du Mont Labs., Inc.
v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
68. See 5 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3357-58 (1969).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 23

Securities Administrators, SEC officials participate at closed sessions
in assisting state administrators to formulate policy. Through its close
relationship with state administrators, SEC officials can obtain the
cooperation of state regulators in taking action against certain
companies or persons against whom action cannot be accomplished by
the SEC itself. For example, this writer has been advised by a state
administrator of two instances where the SEC informally requested and
obtained an order by a state administrator suspending trading in
certain securities. These situations occurred in connection with
secondary transactions in the shares of two companies whose securities
had reached the hands of public investors by virtue of spinoffs. The
SEC staff members, feeling uncertain of their authority to take such
action under the provisions of the federal securities laws, accomplished
their objectives through the regulation of a state administrator who was
granted broad merit type authority under his state statute.
Assuming, however, that federal pre-emption were politically
feasible, it would nevertheless be difficult to predict all of the
consequences. One result is clear: the SEC would be effectively granted
virtual life-and-death control over the entire securities industry.,9 But
would the Commission's policy become more regulatory? In this
connection, those persons who favored the merit approach would flock
to Washington with their complaints and their demands for stricter
regulation. Congress might be asked and eventually prevailed upon to
change the federal laws from full disclosure to the paternalism of merit
qualification. Even if Congress did not effect such a change, the
Commission would be lobbied to adopt more stringent rules, and
although the Commission's staff has no power to judge the merits of
a particular offering, it could make its disclosure rules so difficult to
comply with that they would in practice accomplish the merit system
results7
It is the judgment of this writer that federal pre-emption would be
a mistake. The SEC is composed of only five men appointed by the
President. Often these political appointees have been persons with little
or no experience in the securities industry. Additionally, it is common
knowledge that the Commission's staff is subject to constant turn-over.
69. See Address by Louis Loss at 12, Mexico Stock Exchange, June 6, 1957.

70.

Even without statutory authority, the Commission has recently released a statement of

policy which is an indirect form of merit regulation. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 5049

(Feb. 19, 1970), the Commission has stated, in effect, that if the certifying independent accountant
for an issuer expresses serious doubt about the company's capacity to continue as a going concern,

such issuers will not be permitted to register securities for public sale.

1970]

BLUE SKY LA W REFORM

To entrust them with total.control over the country's securities industry
would, at the least, pose questions to which the answers are not
presently available.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Some constructive recommendations can be made to generate
meaningful reform of the blue sky laws within the states themselves.
In this regard, it is important to separate those persons who would be
in favor of revision as discussed in this article from those who would
be opposed. As previously mentioned, corporate officials and
businessmen associated with small firms directly affected by the blue
sky laws would probably advocate reform, as would the investment
bankers who underwrite such firms. These persons and firms must have
substantial political muscle if they are to achieve significant results in
the state capitols. Such strength can be raised only if the affected
persons organize themselves into permanent groups which are
adequately financed to lobby efficiently for reform. Such organizations
could function with considerable strength in behalf of small
businessmen and investment bankers!' In any event, revision sponsored
by these proposed organizations would probably have less drastic
potential consequences than pre-emption by the federal government.
71. An example of such reform is the 1969 amendment to the Colorado Blue Sky Law
which was sponsored by a group of broker-dealers in that state. That amendment eliminated the

power of the Commissioner to issue stop orders for the main substantive grounds criticized in
this article against registration statements filed by coordination. Laws 1969, H.B. No. 1127, § 1,
I BLUE SKY L. REP.
9111 (1969).

